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ABSTRACT. Social roles are thought to play an important role in determining the capacity for collective action in a community
regarding the use of shared resources. Here we report on the results of a study using a behavioral experimental approach regarding the
relationship between social roles and the performance of social-ecological systems. The computer-based irrigation experiment that was
the basis of this study mimics the decisions faced by farmers in small-scale irrigation systems. In each of 20 rounds, which are analogous
to growing seasons, participants face a two-stage commons dilemma. First they must decide how much to invest in the public
infrastructure, e.g., canals and water diversion structures. Second, they must decide how much to extract from the water made available
by that public infrastructure. Each round begins with a 60-second communication period before the players make their investment and
extraction decisions. By analyzing the chat messages exchanged among participants during the communication stage of the experiment,
we coded up to three roles per participant using the scheme of seven roles known to be important in the literature: leader, knowledge
generator, connector, follower, moralist, enforcer, and observer. Our study supports the importance of certain social roles (e.g.,
connector) previously highlighted by several case study analyses. However, using qualitative comparative analysis we found that none
of the individual roles was sufficient for groups to succeed, i.e., to reach a certain level of group production. Instead, we found that a
combination of at least five roles was necessary for success. In addition, in the context of upstream-downstream asymmetry, we observed
a pattern in which social roles assumed by participants tended to differ by their positions. Although our work generated some interesting
insights, further research is needed to determine how robust our findings are to different action situations, such as biophysical context,
social network, and resource uncertainty.
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ecological networks; social-ecological systems; social roles
INTRODUCTION
The presence of certain social roles is considered crucial for
successful governance of common-pool resources. Over the last
several years, scholars have studied how the presence and function
of certain social roles, such as leaders and connectors, impact the
performance of social-ecological systems. For example, work by
Gutiérrez et al. (2011) suggests that the presence of strong
leadership may be the most important factor to explain success
in the context of comanagement of fisheries worldwide. Other
roles such as followers, connectors, or sense-makers are
considered by several authors as key for the governance of social-
ecological systems, especially in terms of the capacity of the
community to adapt to new conditions (Folke et al. 2003, 2005,
Olsson et al. 2004). Despite the recognized importance of social
roles in governing common-pool resources, challenges in data
collection have made empirical evidence difficult to gather. In this
paper, we contribute to this emerging literature by using
behavioral laboratory experiments to study the linkages between
social roles and collective action. Participants in a typical
behavioral experiment face a social dilemma and must decide
what their level of cooperation will be. We used communication
among participants in a computer-based irrigation experiment to
identify social roles that emerge during the course of experimental
treatments and then identified those roles that might be necessary
for successful collective action in governing a common-pool
resource.  
Following the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework (Ostrom 2005), a behavioral experiment represents an
action arena where the experimental design generates the action
situation in which a randomly drawn group of participants are
invited to make decisions. An action situation refers to the social
space where participants interact, exchange information, and
solve problems. Behavioral experiments enable researchers to
replicate action situations by defining the choices and information
available to the participants as well as the payoffs associated with
different outcomes of participant decisions. Although the
experiments discussed in this paper were performed with
undergraduate students at a major university in the United States,
the same experimental design, i.e., action situation, may be used
with different types of participants, such as farmers or fishers in
developing countries (Harrison and List 2004). Earlier irrigation
experiments run with such diverse participant groups showed that
differences in trust were a more important explanatory variable
for differences in outcomes than was the type of user group, e.g.
fishers, farmers, students, in the experiment (Janssen et al. 2012).
In our research, the existence of different social roles in a
community provided the motivation to test whether these social
roles can help explain group dynamics in experimental studies. In
the context of a multimethod research program, we used different
methods to address various research questions regarding social-
ecological systems (Poteete et al. 2010). As such, our study
complements previous studies that used other methods such as
case studies (e.g., Olsson et al. 2004) and meta-analysis (e.g.,
Gutiérrez et al. 2011)  
The action situation in the computer-based experiment
performed in this study represents a small-scale irrigation system
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in which participants in different positions (from upstream to
downstream locations) interact to maintain the irrigation
infrastructure and share the water generated by that infrastructure
to irrigate their fields. Participants faced two types of social
dilemmas in our experiment (Ostrom and Gardner 1993). First,
they had to collectively contribute enough investment into the
public infrastructure to make water available: water diversion
structures such as weirs had to be repaired and canals had to be
cleaned each year. Secondly, they had to coordinate for fair
distribution of water, which could be undermined by upstream-
downstream asymmetry of participant positions. However,
upstream participants could not adequately maintain the
infrastructure without help from downstream participants. This
interdependency thus deterred upstream participants from
overappropriating water because downstream participants who
did not get enough water could reduce their contributions to the
infrastructure (Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Janssen et al. 2012).
Previous studies using similar experimental settings have found
that upstream participants invest and extract more than
downstream participants and that the contributions to the public
infrastructure can be explained by a combined effect of observed
inequality in the previous round and asymmetric access privileges
(Janssen et al. 2011a, 2001b, 2012, Pérez et al. 2013). Building on
these results, we attempted to analyze whether social roles can
help further explain differences in groups’ performance in terms
of water extraction.  
Prior to the investment and extraction stages of the game,
participants in our experiment could chat via text messages during
the communication stage of the game to discuss whatever they
wish before they made investment and extraction decisions. We
recorded all of these text messages, which we then used to discern
the social roles that participants in our experiment had naturally
assumed. Although the underlying causal processes are still
debated, it is well known that communication improves outcomes
in social dilemmas (Ostrom et al. 1992, Sally 1995, Janssen et al.
2010). Previous studies have concluded that it is the option for
and the amount of communication rather than the content of the
communication that is necessary to improve outcomes (Pavitt et
al. 2005, Janssen 2010, but see Pavitt 2011). We analyzed
communication by linking the content of the communication
among participants to social roles. Our goal was to investigate
how social roles at the group level and roles assumed by different
positions affected the performance of the groups. We were aware
that a mismatch might occur between what players said they were
going to do (i.e., the role that they seemed to assume) and what
they really did during the game. Furthermore, there might be a
difference between the social role we identified from chat data and
what participants might have actually experienced. Note that
most of the roles we distinguished from the chat data cannot be
distinguished in the data on investment and appropriation
decisions.  
We considered seven types of roles: leader, knowledge generator,
connector, follower, moralist, enforcer, and observer. (For a
definition of each social role, see Table 1.) These roles are often
thought to be essential functional groups of actors that are
associated with adaptive governance of social-ecological systems
(Ostrom 1990, Folke et al. 2005). Although these roles do not
constitute an exhaustive list of all possible roles, they may
sufficiently represent the spectrum of key roles in our irrigation
experiment. A growing number of studies support the importance
of these seven roles for successful collective action. For example,
numerous studies suggest that certain individuals often act to
provide leadership and knowledge in social problems (Olsson et
al. 2004, Pavitt et al. 2007, Gutiérrez et al. 2011). These sources
argue that the presence of leaders and their generation of
knowledge may enhance the likelihood of individuals solving
collective action problems. Studies also illustrate that the presence
of connectors, individuals who link with other individuals within
and beyond their social networks, may enhance the capacity of
local communities to adapt to new conditions (Stubbs and Lemon
2001, Tompkins et al. 2002, Ernstson et al. 2010). It is argued that,
by bringing in novel ideas and facilitating information exchange
across networks, connectors help local communities find
cooperative solutions more effectively. Some studies also support
the importance of the role of moralists (Pavitt et al. 2005, Janssen
2010, Poteete et al. 2010). It is suggested that individuals caught
in social dilemmas often voice norms of equity and continuously
try to ensure their mutual commitment to such social norms.
Finally, the roles of observer and enforcer are widely observed in
field and behavioral studies (Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gachter
2000, Henrich et al. 2006, Rustagi et al. 2010). These functions
reinforce norms and rule conformance and are considered crucial
for the success of collective action (Ostrom 1990).  
Instead of investigating the effect of a specific role, we focused
more on discerning combinations of roles that increase the
likelihood that users will self-organize and successfully solve the
commons dilemmas they face. One example is the possible
relationship between knowledge generators and connectors.
Diffusion of knowledge will be hindered if  knowledge generators
are not linked to others via connectors. To address this question
of how role combinations affect collective action, we used
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA; Ragin 1987). Using QCA,
researchers can determine combinations of conditions (in our
case, adopted social roles) that are linked to certain outcomes (in
our case, group success as measured by total group water
extractions). We undertook QCA at the group (roles adopted by
any of the players in a group) and positional (roles adopted by
participants in the different positions [upstream, downstream] in
each group) levels to analyze both how different combinations of
roles (group level) and roles assumed by participants in different
positions (positional level) affect group performance.  
QCA at the group level allowed us to understand which role or
combination of roles may be necessary for a group to succeed.
For example, are observers necessary? Is it the combination of
leaders and moralists that is critical? At the positional level, QCA
allowed us to study where roles emerged in successful groups. For
example, do groups with the leader role adopted by players in
positions furthest upstream or furthest downstream (A and E in
Fig. 1) do better than groups with the leader role adopted by a
player in the middle position (C in Fig. 1)? Which combinations
of roles are more likely to be adopted by the player in position A
in successful groups? Our results suggest that it is not a specific
role but rather a combination of a minimum of five roles that was
necessary for success. For example, we found that at least one
participant adopting the role of leader was necessary, but not
sufficient, for success. In one of the role combinations present in
successful groups, a leader was accompanied by at least one each
of a follower, a knowledge generator, a connector, and a moralist.
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At the positional level, we found heterogeneous combinations of
roles related to participants’ positions. For example, in successful
groups, players in middle positions adopted the role of leader
more frequently than upstream or downstream players.
Table 1. Definition of social roles and example of the type of
messages used to code them.
 
Connector
(C)
Definition:
Transmit the decisions made by the leader or opinions
of other players.
Example of messages:
B: "hey C, tell D to only do 200"; C: "okay, D only do
200"
Enforcer (E) Definition:
Punish the behavior of other players.
Example of messages:
"Since ABC are not being fair we shouldn’t invest any
tokens", "I’m going on strike"
Follower (F) Definition:
Follows a leader.
Example of messages:
"okay A," "I’ll do the same," "hey C, let’s listen to A"
Knowledge
generator
(K)
Definition:
Shares information about the rules or status of the
game.
Example of messages:
"as long as we keep the efficiency above 66% we will be
fine"
Leader (L) Definition:
Proposes a strategy/rule about investment or
harvesting and at least one other player follows it.
Example of messages:
"we need to invest 15," "B can you tell A to only take
300?"
Moralist (M) Definition:
Shows concern about downstream players or looks for
fair shares for the whole group.
Example of messages:
"I feel bad for E," "E is getting none :(" "ok, share water
is good idea"
Observer (O) Definition:
Shares info about the compliance of the rules or the
behavior of other players, as well as the player who
answers to another observer request about information
about other players.
Example of messages:
"hey ask B how much A has"; "A is at like 19," "last
round C took 470"
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the experiment. The player’s position is
indicated in green (in the figure, position C) and the other
players’ positions are indicated in yellow. In this screenshot,
player C’s gate is open, and all other players’ gates are closed.
Participants located in positions A, B, C, D, and E need to
make decisions whether to open or close their gate. The water is
coming from the left of the screen.
METHODS
We used the chat messages exchanged among participants during
the communication stage of the computer-based irrigation
experiment to code social roles that participants adopted.
Identified social roles were used as the conditions in a QCA to
obtain the combinations of social roles that might have led to
higher group performance. We did not code the actual behavior
of the players but rather the social roles that players seemed to
assume based on their messages during the communication stage
of the game. Figure 2 graphically summarizes the methods and
main results obtained through QCA.
Irrigation lab experiments
The experiment took the form of a five-player irrigation game.
The participants occupied different positions, A, B, C, D, and E,
related to their position along the irrigation canal (A was the head
end, E was the tail end).  
The entire experimental treatment, which takes about 75 minutes,
consists of 2 training rounds prior to the start of the real
experiment, followed by 20 actual rounds. Each round proceeds
in the following sequence: communication, investment, and
appropriation stages.
Communication stage
At the beginning of each round, participants are allowed to
communicate via text messages using a chat interface for 60
seconds. Participants are allowed to discuss anything they wish
with the usual caveats, such as proper language, no threats, and
no promises of side payments.
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Fig. 2. Graphical summary of methods and results. Following qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) notation,
in the solution box an uppercase letter means that the condition is present, and a lowercase letter means that the
condition is absent. csQCA = crisp-set QCA, fsQCA = fuzzy-set QCA.
Investment stage
Participants must make a decision concerning how much to invest
to provide public infrastructure, such as canals and water
diversion structures. At the beginning of each round, participants
are endowed with 10 tokens. Participants can then invest all, zero,
or a portion of their endowment into maintaining public
infrastructure. Each token is worth $0.05. The production of
public infrastructure depends linearly on the total investment
made by the group: each token invested increases the
infrastructure stock by one unit. However, after each round, the
infrastructure stock depreciates by a constant percentage. The
relationship between water delivery capacity and infrastructure
stock exhibits a nonlinear, S-shaped relationship. Below a certain
threshold, infrastructure generates no output, i.e., water. Once
this threshold is crossed, additional investment generates
increasing marginal returns on water delivery capacity. Beyond a
certain stock level, additional investment generates diminishing
marginal returns. In the experiments, we chose a scaling that made
it impossible for one person to create sufficient infrastructure
stock to deliver water without the help of others. For example,
unless a sufficiently large group of farmers worked together at
the same time to repair headgate structures and canals each year,
the system became dysfunctional and delivered little to no water.
Hence cooperation was required to generate an adequate level of
public infrastructure.  
The rate of water delivery as a function of infrastructure efficiency
is shown in Table 2. The maximum supply of water is 30 cubic
feet per second (cf/s) in the default case. In the investment stage
of each round, participants are shown a screen that displayed
Table 2. Participants are reminded what the infrastructure stock
in the previous round was and are told that it has decreased by a
certain amount. They are then asked to make their investment
decision. For example, if  the infrastructure stock in the previous
round was 75 and has decreased by 25, the players are told that
the infrastructure stock at the beginning of the round was 50 (75 -
25 = 50). Suppose that each player invests 7 tokens (7 x 5 = 35
total investment). Then the infrastructure stock is 50 + 35 = 85.
Based on Table 2, the system is capable of delivering a maximum
of 40 cf/s during the appropriation stage. After participants make
their investment decisions, they are shown a screen that
summarizes the following information: how much their neighbors
invested, the level of infrastructure efficiency, the water delivery
capacity, and the supply of water to the irrigation system. Because
the infrastructure stock depreciates by 25 units in each round,
each participant needs to invest on average five tokens to keep the
infrastructure at the same level.
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Table 2. Production function of water delivery as a function of
infrastructure efficiency.
 
Infrastructure efficiency (%) Water delivery (cf/s)
< 45 0
46-51 5
52-55 10
56-58 15
59-61 20
62-65 25
66-70 30
71-80 35
81-100 40
Appropriation stage
Participants make decisions regarding opening and closing their
irrigation gates over a 50-second period as they attempted to
divert water to their field and grow a crop. Participants are
presented with the dashboard shown in Figure 1. Participants are
shown the water delivery capacity (top left), how much water was
available in the river (top right), and how much time was left in
the round (top center). Participants see water flowing (movement
of white dots to simulate water flow) and their gates opening and
closing in real time. The real-time interaction was purposely
chosen to include the need for real-time coordination to solve the
asymmetric commons problem. That is, participants execute the
strategy (if  any) they worked out in the communication stage of
a round. As participants open their gates, they accumulate water
in their fields. Table 3 shows the earnings generated by a crop as
a function of the total water delivered to the participants’ fields.
If  less than 150 cf  of water is diverted to their field, the participant
earns no tokens. The maximum number of tokens is earned when
a total of 500 to 549 cf  of water was delivered to a field. Applying
more than 549 cf  is detrimental to crop production (water logging)
and the earnings go down accordingly.
Table 3. Earnings resulting from amount of water applied to the
field.
 
Water units received (cf) Tokens earned
< 150 0
150-199 1
200-249 4
250-299 10
300-349 15
350-399 18
400-499 19
500-549 20
550-649 19
650-699 18
700-749 15
750-799 10
800-849 4
850-899 1
> 899 0
 
The maximum capacity of each player’s gate is 25 cf/s. If  a
participant opened his/her gate and 25 cf/s is available in the main
canal, it takes 20 s to reach the maximum earnings possible. With
5 participants attempting to maximize their earnings, there is a
demand of 5 x 500 = 2500 cf. Because the maximum supply of
water is 30 cf/s x 50s = 1500 cf  of water, there is a situation of
resource scarcity. If  participants stopp at 300 cf, each can generate
earnings of 15 tokens. However, if  the upstream participants who
had first access to water maximize their earnings, the two
downstream participants will not receive enough water to
generate any earnings from growing a crop. For example,
participant A could open her gate for the first 20 seconds,
participant B for the first 36 seconds, and participants C, D, and
E for the entire period, generating earnings of 20 (500 cf) tokens
each for participants A and B, 19 (430 cf) for participant C, 0 (70
cf) for participant D, and 0 (0 cf) for participant E. This payoff
structure sets up our asymmetric commons dilemma.  
This experiment is a modification of the treatment reported by
Anderies et al. (2013). In the study by Anderies et al., participants
had full information about the other participants’ behavior and
could communicate with all participants in their group. In the
experiment reported here, we limited communication by imposing
a linearly connected network in which participants could only
communicate with their immediate neighbors. Using this network
structure, we attempted to mimic the challenges of
communication, monitoring, and sanctioning that farmers in
small-scale irrigation systems may face. Each participant’s view
of the action arena (dashboard) is shown in Figure 1. The
participant saw her own field in green. The structure of the social
network in this experiment was designed such that participants
could only communicate with and observe the actions of their
immediate neighbors; for example, participant B could only
communicate with and observe the investment and extraction of
participants A and C. Notice that in Figure 1, player C can see
that player B and player D both have their gates closed, but cannot
observe players A and E. Likewise, player B can see that player
C’s gate is open and player A’s gate is closed, but cannot observe
players D and E.  
Every group starts round 1 of the experiment with an initial
infrastructure stock of 75 (75% efficiency), and the infrastructure
depreciation rate is 25 for the first 10 rounds of the experiment.
In the first 10 rounds, the infrastructure depreciation rate and the
amount of water supply from rivers remain constant. After round
10, however, these two conditions begin to fluctuate. For the
purposes of this study, we considered the first 10 rounds in which
uncertainty about the water supply and the infrastructure
depreciation rate was not present. Further information about the
experimental setting as well as the effects of variability on group
performance can be found in Anderies et al. (2013).  
The Nash and social equilibria for this experimental design can
be calculated by assuming that participants have zero reaction
time and attempt in the opening and closing of gates to maximize
their number of tokens. In the first round there is no need to invest
in the public infrastructure because the delivery capacity (35 cf/
s) is already higher than the supply (30 cf/s) of water. Anderies et
al. (2013) showed that the Nash equilibrium for selfish rational
actors led to investments only during the first three rounds by the
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upstream participants. If  there was a positive water delivery
capacity (infrastructure stock was above 45) and a participant
had not reached 500 cf  of water, the participant kept their gate
open. Participants only invested in the public infrastructure if
they could rely on a positive return on investment. Participants
A, B, and C invested modest levels in round 2 to reach the
infrastructure level of 66. In round 3 only participant A invested.
After round 3 the infrastructure had deteriorated to a level that
did not support water delivery. In this noncooperative
equilibrium, the participants earned 575 tokens as a group in the
first 10 rounds. In contrast, participants who followed a
cooperative strategy kept the infrastructure stock at 66 (delivery
capacity = 30 cf/s) and invested 25 tokens every round in the
infrastructure to maintain it at that level. The cooperative strategy
led to 978 tokens for the group in 10 rounds. An example of one
of the possible cooperative strategies was to have four
participants, A-D, investing six tokens, and one participant, E,
investing only one token. If  the participants coordinated their
gates, growing a crop could generate 15 tokens for participants A
to D and 10 tokens for E. Hence, a cooperative strategy could
lead to an outcome in which each participant earned 19 tokens
per round.
Experiment participation
The experiments were performed at Arizona State University in
the spring semester of 2012. The participants were randomly
recruited from a database of undergraduate students from all
majors who had indicated that they were willing to participate in
our human-subject experiment. Invitations were sent out to a
random sample of the whole population when a session of our
experiment was scheduled. Based on exit surveys, of the 115
students (23 groups of 5 players) that participated in the
experiments reported in this paper, 49% were female and the
average age was 20 years. Average earnings were $22, including a
show-up bonus of $5 plus payments for their play (made in
private) for experiments with an average duration of 75 minutes.
The individual minimum and maximum earnings were $12.20 and
$34.70, respectively. The final earnings, the total investment, and
extraction by each group are shown in Appendix 1.
Coding different roles
In accord with the literature, we defined seven social roles that
participants in the irrigation experiment could adopt: connector
(C), enforcer (E), follower (F), knowledge generator (K), leader
(L), moralist (M), and observer (O). See Table 1 for definitions.
Participants can adopt more than one role at a time (e.g., leaders
can be moralists, enforcers can observe other’s actions at the same
time, and so forth). We coded up to three roles per participant in
each of two time slices: rounds 1-5 and 6-10. We considered two
groups of rounds because more than one round was needed to
detect the role or roles that each participant was adopting, and
at the same time, assumed roles by participants change as the
game progresses. The number of roles held by a participant varied;
some players assumed only one role (e.g., an obedient follower),
whereas others took on multiple roles. On average, participants
assumed two roles in each of the two time slices. We limited the
number of coded roles per participant to three to consider the
most important roles assumed by each player and because in most
of the cases players assumed fewer than four roles at a time. In
the few cases in which more than three rolls were identified, coders
selected the more relevant roles by counting the number of chat
messages representative of each role. After round 10,
environmental uncertainty is introduced into the experiment. We
did not include these later rounds (11-20) in our current coding
because our aim was to study the effect of social roles on the
performance of social-ecological systems in a stable environment.
Future studies will analyze how social roles adopted by
participants in the irrigation experiment are affected by
environmental uncertainty as well as how social roles may evolve
during the game.  
Coding was based on the text messages that the participants
exchanged during the communication stage (Table 1) and not the
actual behavior of the players. Roles were coded independently
by two of the authors (Pérez and Yu). Each coder used cues from
the phrases and words found in the text messages to identify the
most fitting roles as defined by our guidelines (Table 1). For
example, if  a participant sent messages that raised concerns about
unequal appropriation of water, that participant was coded as
moralist. We did not attempt to uncover the actual mechanisms
that might link group composition to outcomes. Further, we
recognize the potential importance of the relationship between
social roles and real actions during the game (Cardenas 2003).
These issues are beyond the scope of this paper and will be the
focus of future research. Having said that, the work we report on
here looking only at correlations between group composition
detected thought chat messages and outcomes is a first step and
already has generated several interesting insights.  
After both coders completed their coding, results were compared
for mismatches. The two coders arrived at their final coding
decisions by discussing these mismatched roles until a consensus
was reached. To assess intercoder reliability, we used the simplest
measure available: percent agreement between the two coders. We
chose percent agreement over more sophisticated measures (e.g.,
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient and Krippendorff’s alpha) that
account for coding agreements occurring by chance. The reason
is that our coding scheme had 64 possibilities of role-combination
per player (i.e., coding up to 3 roles per player from 7 possible
roles and no role). With such a large number of coding
possibilities, the probability that coding agreements occurred by
chance was very low in our study. Percent agreement was derived
in the following way. For each case (each time slice per
participant), the numbers of identified roles and blank spaces (no
role) matched by the two coders were counted and then divided
by three, because three roles were possible per player. This number
represents the degree of agreement per case. This number was
then summed for the entire set of cases and divided by the total
number of cases to derive the measure of percent agreement. The
resulting percent agreement was 76%. A minimum threshold for
an acceptable level of intercoder reliability for exploratory studies
is often regarded to be around 70% (Lombard et al. 2002, Riffe
et al. 2005). Based on this figure and the exploratory nature of
our work, we suggest that our coding work exhibits reasonable
intercode reliability.
Qualitative comparative analysis
We undertook QCAs (Ragin 1987, 2000) to examine different
combinations of conditions, i.e., social roles, that are associated
with improved group performance. QCA is an approach to
analysis of data sets with small sample sizes that relies on Boolean
algebra for cross-case comparisons to reduce causal complexity
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into a minimal set of conditions necessary for an outcome (Ragin
1987). QCA establishes conditions of necessity and sufficiency. A
condition is necessary if  it must be present for a certain outcome
to occur. A condition is sufficient if, by itself, it can produce a
certain outcome (Ragin 1987). A condition is both necessary and
sufficient if  it is the only cause for the outcome. If  various
conditions can produce the outcome by themselves, these are
sufficient but not necessary causes. Finally, if  a cause only appears
in a subset of combinations that produce the outcome, then this
causal condition is neither necessary nor sufficient. The results of
the sufficiency test are summarized in the so-called truth table,
which lists all possible combinations of the conditions and
outcomes, and shows how often they appear in the set of cases
considered, i.e., consistency. The higher the value of consistency,
the more cases or membership scores in the row have the same
outcome. Results of the truth table are simplified by means of the
Quine-McCluskey algorithm commonly used in QCA (Quine
1955, McCluskey 1956). For example, if  some expressions differ
in only one causal condition to produce the same outcome, then
that causal condition can be considered irrelevant and can be
removed to create a simpler, combined expression (Ragin 1987).
Further information regarding the QCA methodology can be
found in Ragin (1987 and 2000), or by visiting the COMPASS
website (http://www.compasss.org).  
Figure 2 graphically summarizes the process by which QCA was
used in this study. At the group level, our conditions related to
whether roles were present or absent in the different groups. In
this case, we were not concerned with whether a particular role
occured at position A, B, C, etc. At the positional level, on the
other hand, our conditions related to the roles each participant
assumed in each group. In this case, we were concerned about
where roles occur; QCA at the positional level helped us to
understand if  the position (i.e., position A, B, C, D, or E) of a
player who assumed a given role was relevant to explaining group
success.
Group-level analysis
The two main QCA variants, crisp-set QCA (csQCA) for
dichotomized variables and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) for values
between zero and one, were conducted at the group level. In the
csQCA our conditions were the presence or absence of roles in
the different groups. In the fsQCA, we used the frequencies of
each role in the groups as conditions for the emergence of group
success. Our motivation was the idea that the frequency of roles
better explains group success than whether a certain role is present
or not. QCA results at the group level using csQCA and fsQCA
can give us complementary information about the relationships
between social roles and collective action.  
For the csQCA, the condition, i.e., presence of social role, was
considered 0 if  the role was absent and 1 if  present during any of
the 2 snapshots (i.e., rounds 1-5 and 6-10) in each group. For
example, if  one player assumed the role of leader during one
snapshot it was coded as 1. For the fsQCA, our raw data included
values from 0 (none of the players assumed the role during any
of the snapshots) up to 5 (the role was present during both
snapshots in more than one player). For example, if  the role of
leader was absent it was given a value of 0, if  it was assumed by
one player during one snapshot, it was given a 0.6 value, and if
the role of leader was kept during the two snapshots, even if  it
was assumed by different players, a value of 1 was given. Notice
that 0.5 in fsQCA is the crossover point in the assessment of
whether a case is more “in” than “out of” a set; scores less than
0.5 but greater than 0 indicate that the objects are more out of
than in a set and scores close to 1 indicate strong membership.
When players assumed more than one social role at the same time,
we considered those social roles as independent observations.
Position-level analysis
We analyzed two cases at the positional level using csQCA: each
position independently and all the positions and roles together.
In the first case, our aim was to analyze the combinations of roles
adopted by each position for success. For example, which roles
were adopted by position A in successful groups? In the second
case, we identified the combinations of roles adopted in each
group by each position. That is, did groups with leaders in position
A and E did better than groups with leaders in position C? Is it
important that the knowledge generator was in position A while
the moralist was in position C? Just as in the group-level analysis,
the condition, i.e., presence of social role, was considered zero if
the role was absent and one if  present during any of the two
snapshots in each position.
Measure of group performance
We selected the total group water extractions (Ext) as the indicator
of group performance. The amount of water extracted in one
round does not affect the water available for the next round, and
this amount only depends on the levels of cooperation. Water
extractions were highly correlated (Spearman’s correlation = 0.6)
with other important indicators: investments in the public
infrastructure, earnings, and efficiency of the public
infrastructure, as well as the gini coefficients of investments and
extractions among the members of each group (Table 4). For
example, if  inequality in extractions increased, players extracting
less water usually reacted by decreasing their investments in the
public infrastructure. This situation caused the water level to drop
and with it, the level of water extraction. In fact, we could view
the amount of the total water extracted as an indicator of group
production. As such, increases in water extraction were correlated
with increases in cooperation in this experiment. Appendix 2
shows QCA results using the percentage of the maximum earning
as the indicator of group performance.  
For the csQCA, a group was considered successful if  the group
extraction was above the median of the extractions of all groups.
Using the median as a threshold for group success was considered
adequate because the mode of group extraction coincided with
the median, and the median was the only threshold in our data
(Fig. 3). For the outcome in the fsQCA, we considered breaks in
the extraction level between groups to define thresholds values
(Fig. 3). Appendix 1 shows the experimental results and Table
A3.1 in Appendix 3 shows the raw data used in the csQCA and
fsQCA.  
All analyses were conducted using the R Project for Statistical
Computing package (R Development Core Team 2008),
particularly applying the package QCA (Thiem and Dusa 2013).
In the Results section we present a comprehensive description of
the QCA results. More detailed results, i.e., truth tables and
necessity tests, can be found in Appendix 3.
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Table 4. csQCA results of each position independently (truth table
is shown in Appendix 3).
 
Position Role Cases
L K C F M E O Group number
A - 0 1 0 0 1 15; 16
0 - 1 1 0 1 6,11
0 1 0 0 0 0 1
B - 1 0 1 0 0 0 4; 9
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 15
C 0 - 1 1 0 0 1 11; 6
1 - 1 1 0 0 0 16; 9
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 10
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1, 4
D - 1 0 1 0 0 1 13,16; 9
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 15
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 11
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 3
E 0 0 1 0 0 0 1,11,23
0 1 0 1 0 0 6
1 1 0 0 0 0 3
The numeral 1 means that the condition is present; 0, that the condition is
absent. During minimization, if  some configurations differ in only one
causal condition in producing the same outcome, then that causal
condition is considered irrelevant. The causal condition that distinguished
several expressions is represented with a dash (—) in the table. Cases from
the same configuration are separated by a comma. Cases from different
configurations are separated by a semicolon. L = leader, K = knowledge
generator, C = connector, F = follower, M = moralist, E = enforcer, O =
observer, csQCA = crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis.
Fig. 3. Selection of successful (above the median of extractions)
and unsuccessful (below the median of extractions) groups and
fuzzy values to run qualitative comparative analysis. The
amount of water extracted, the number of group that extracted
each amount, and the fuzzy values assigned are represented for
each group. Circular dots represent groups’ resource extraction
levels, stars represent fuzzy values, and bars mark the frequency
of groups extracting at the same level as the given group (e.g.,
groups 6,11,15, and 23 extracted the same amount of water;
thus, the frequency is 4. For all other groups, their extraction
level is unique (i.e., their frequency is 1), numbers represent
group number, the blue line represents the median of
extractions, and the dotted red line represents average
extractions
RESULTS
As Figure 2 shows, using QCA at the group level, we found that
group success emerged in four combinations of roles. All of them
included the roles of leader, follower, and knowledge generator.
Using csQCA, one resulting combination included the roles of
connector and observer, and the other combination included the
roles of connector and moralist. Using fsQCA, one combination
included the roles of moralist, enforcer, and observer, and the
other one included the roles of connector, enforcer, and moralist.
At the positional level, we found that some participants in some
positions were more likely to assume certain social roles.
Considering each position independently, we obtained from 3-6
solutions per position and 12 solutions when we analyzed all
positions together (Fig. 2).
Results at the group level
As Figure 4 shows, all 23 groups coded had at least 1 follower, 1
knowledge generator, and 1 leader. The remainder of the roles,
connector, enforcer, moralist, and observer, were missing in some
of the groups. We found that the most frequent role was the
follower, followed by the knowledge generator, the moralist, the
observer, the connector, and the enforcer (Fig. 4A).
Fig. 4. Emergent social roles at the group level. (A) Percentage
of groups in which the role was present (left blue bars) and
percentage of participants that take on each role (right purple
bars). (B) Distribution of presence and absence of each role
when the data in A are broken down into successful (blue bars
in the lower half  of the figure) and unsuccessful (red bars in the
upper half  of the figure) groups. Dark shades mean that the
role is present; light shades mean that the role is absent. (C)
Frequency of each role in successful (right blue bars) and
unsuccessful (left red bars) groups. All groups had at least one
leader, knowledge generator, and follower. The rest of the social
roles did not emerge in all the groups. The most frequent role
was the follower, followed by the knowledge generator, the
moralist, the observer, the connector and the enforcer. L =
leader, K = knowledge generator, C = connector, F = follower,
M = moralist, E = enforcer, O = observer.
Figure 4B shows the distribution of roles by successful and
unsuccessful groups. Using csQCA, we found that group success
emerged in two combinations of roles. The combinations were
connector and observer, and connector and moralist (Fig. 2).
Note that in both combinations, a necessary condition for groups
to be successful was to have at least one player adopting the role
of connector. Interestingly, in neither case was it necessary to have
a player adopting the role of enforcer. In addition to these
conditions, successful groups also needed to have one player
adopting the role of either moralist or observer. Note that because
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all groups had the roles of leader, follower, and knowledge
generator, we did not include them in this analysis. Although all
of the successful combinations of roles included at least one
connector but no enforcers, 67% of the unsuccessful combinations
of roles included one of these two roles. In addition, the roles of
moralist and observer, found in 50% of the successful
combinations, were also present in 83% of the unsuccessful
combinations.  
fsQCA for the frequency of each role during the two snapshots
(Fig.4C) revealed two combinations of roles for successful groups.
It was necessary for them to have a leader, knowledge generator,
follower, moralist, and enforcer and to have either an observer or
a connector. There were only two unsuccessful combinations of
roles. One combination included all of the roles except moralist,
and the other combination did not include the roles of enforcer
and observer.
Results at the positional level
Our results show that the distribution of roles by positions was
heterogeneous (Fig. 5). The role of leader was rarely assumed by
players in position E, but was frequently assumed by players in
position C. Players in position A were frequently knowledge
generators, and connectors were often found in position D. The
role of follower was frequently assumed by players in positions B
and D and less frequently by players in position E. Players in
position E were rarely moralists and frequently enforcers. Players
in upstream and middle positions (A, B, and C) seldom assumed
the role of an enforcer. The role of observer was frequently
adopted by players in positions B, C, and D.
Fig. 5. Percentage of groups in which a role is present by
position. This figure emphasizes that the role of follower was
most prevalent, and most followers occupied position B. It also
shows that enforcers seldom occupied positions A, B, or C. As
one would expect, enforcers tended to emerge in position E. L
= leader, K = knowledge generator, C = connector, F =
follower, M = moralist, E = enforcer, O = observer.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of roles by each position in
successful and unsuccessful groups. Considering each position
independently, csQCA generated up to six possible combinations
of roles per position (Table 4). These combinations included from
one to six social roles. Table 4 shows that in all combinations at
least one player in the upstream or midstream positions (A, B, C)
adopted the role of follower (for player B, all the successful
combinations included the role of follower), whereas 50% and
60% of the combinations had players that adopted the same role
for positions D and E, respectively. Interestingly, no players
adopted the role of enforcer in any of the combinations except
for two cases in which a player in position D adopted the role of
enforcer. For positions C and D, 50% or more of the successful
combinations included the role of leader; this proportion dropped
up to 20% for the rest of the positions. The role of connector was
found more often in position C in the successful combinations.
The role of moralist was present in more than 30% of the
successful combinations for all the positions. Finally, position E
did not include the role of observer in the successful combinations,
whereas more than half  of the successful combinations included
this role for positions A, C, and D.  
In addition, we performed a csQCA for all positions together.
Because effective use of csQCA depends on the ratio of cases to
causal conditions (meaning there should be the same or fewer
conditions than cases), we selected the roles of leader, moralist,
enforcer, and observer for the analysis of the combinations of
roles and positions. In this analysis, we omitted the role of follower
because it was correlated with the role of leader (i.e., if  there was
a follower, there was a leader and the other way around), the role
of connector because only positions B, C, and D could have this
role, and the role of knowledge generator because we considered
that the presence of this role might improve the performance of
the groups independently of which position was assuming this
role. The csQCA led to 12 combinations of roles for successful
groups (Table 5). Even though only one case, i.e., the successful
group, was included in each specific combination of roles per
position (Table 5), we highlight some interesting results that
emerged from the frequency distribution of each role-position in
the 12 successful combinations.
Table 5. csQCA results of roles by positions (truth table is shown
in Appendix 3).
 
Position Cases
A B C D E
Condition Group number
L ME O L ME O L ME O L ME O L ME O
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 23
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 13
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 9
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 15
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 11
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 10
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 19
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
The numeral 1 means that the condition is present; 0, that the
condition is absent. L = leader, M = moralist, E = enforcer, O =
observer, csQCA = crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of the presence/absence of each role per position when the data shown in Figure 5 are
broken down into successful (blue bars in the lower half  of the figure) and unsuccessful (red bars in the upper
half  of the figure) groups. Dark shading means that the role is present; light shading means that the role is
absent. Some social roles emerged more frequently in some of the positions.
Positions with roles
In almost all of the successful combinations (92%), players in
positions B and C assumed at least one role. After these positions,
the most frequent position with a role in the successful groups
was position D (75%) followed by position E (67%). Position A
was the least frequent position with a role in the successful groups
(58%). On the contrary, in the unsuccessful combinations,
position C was the least frequent position with a role (55%),
followed by positions A (64%), E (73%), and B and D (82%) (see
Table A3.8 in Appendix 3).
Frequency of roles per position
Players in position C assumed the most roles in the resulting
combinations (50% of the 48 possible; i.e., 48 means that 1
position has the 4 roles in the 12 csQCA combinations), followed
by positions B and D (33%), A (25%), and E (17%). In the
unsuccessful combinations, players in positions B and D assumed
relatively more roles (36% of the 44 possible; i.e., 44 means that
1 position has the 4 roles in the 11 csQCA unsuccessful
combinations), followed by positions C and E (32%), and A (30%).
Roles assumed by players in different positions
As for the roles occupied by players in different positions, Figure
7A shows that players in position C more frequently assumed the
role of leader and players in position E rarely assumed this role
in the successful combinations of roles. Enforcers were usually in
downstream positions; observers were in positions B, C, and D;
and moralists were in midstream and upstream positions (A, B,
and C). In relation to the role of leader, another interesting pattern
was that in the four combinations in which a leader existed in
Fig. 7. Frequency distribution of each role per position in the
successful (A) and unsuccessful (B) combinations of social
roles. This graphic suggests a pattern in which in successful
groups, leaders, and moralists tend to emerge upstream,
observers emerge midstream, and enforcers downstream. In
unsuccessful groups, enforcers emerge in all positions, probably
because of more conflict in the group. L = leader, M =
moralist, O = observer, E = enforcer.
position A, there were also other leaders in different positions in
the same group. This pattern did not occur when a player in
position B, C, or D was the leader. In the unsuccessful
combinations (Fig. 7B), players in positions B and E more
frequently assumed the role of leader. In the unsuccessful
combinations, the role of enforcer emerged in all the positions
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but more frequently in downstream positions. In addition, the
roles of observer and moralist were more uniformly distributed
in the unsuccessful combinations compared with the successful
combinations, but more frequently in downstream positions (Fig.
7).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we used communication data in a behavioral lab
experiment as a proxy to define participants’ social roles and to
discern combinations of roles that may have affected the
performance of the groups. Our results support previous studies
based on case study analysis, which argue that roles such as leader,
knowledge generator, or connector are key to explaining success
in the governance of social-ecological systems (e.g., Olsson et al.
2004). Of the seven roles considered in this study (leader,
knowledge generator, connector, follower, moralist, enforcer, and
observer), our results suggest that none were sufficient for
improved group performance. Rather, a combination of at least
five roles was necessary for improved outcomes. Because all
groups had the role of leader, knowledge generator, and follower,
these were necessary conditions, but not sufficient. In addition to
these roles, successful groups also included one of these subsets:
(1) a connector and observer, (2) a connector and moralist, (3) a
moralist, enforcer, and observer, or (4) a moralist, connector, and
enforcer. Our results also highlight the importance of positions
and roles. The asymmetries and network structure introduced in
our experiment caused players in some positions to be more likely
to assume certain social roles. We did not consider the actual
behavior of participants to code the social roles players were
assuming. For example, a player was coded as a leader if  he/she
proposed a strategy/rule about investment or harvesting and at
least one other player said he/she would follow the proposed
strategy/rule but not if  that player actually followed the proposed
strategy. Similarly, a player was coded as a moralist if  the player
showed concern about downstream players or looked for fair
shares for the whole group but not if  the player actually took a
fair amount of the resource. However, results already provide very
interesting insight into understanding how social roles may
influence governance of common-pool resources.  
We attempt to further explain our results by relating some of the
details of what happened in some of the groups to their emergent
role combinations. Group 3 is considered to have a successful
combination of roles by means of both csQCA and fsQCA (see
Tables A3.2 and A3.4 in the Appendix 3). In this group,
participants in positions B, C, and D were connectors, whereas
participants in positions A and E were leaders. Owing to the
connector role of B, C, and D, there was very active
communication between downstream and upstream participants.
In addition, players A and B took on the moralist role by showing
sympathy toward downstream players and sharing the water with
them. In response, the downstream players continued to invest in
the infrastructure, which helps to maintain infrastructure
efficiency and water availability at high levels. As a result, the
group water extraction level stayed at a high level. In the worst-
performing group (group 18, Fig. 3) upstream players (positions
A and B) did not share water with downstream players (D and
E). Players D and E attempted to warn upstream players with the
threat of noninvesting, but player C barely communicated and
did not connect upstream and downstream players. As a
consequence, all players ended up not investing, and
infrastructure efficiency and water availability subsequently
dropped to low levels. In this group, we found enforcers in
positions A, D, and E and observers in positions A, B, D, and E,
but no moralists. A similar unfolding of events was observed in
groups 2 and 9 (see Tables A3.2 and A3.4 in Appendix 3).  
This sequence of events and combinations of roles show that the
structure of the social network used in this study, in which
participants could observe and communicate with their
immediate neighbors, made the connector a necessary role in most
of the combinations that led to the emergence of group success.
This critical role of connectors highlights the importance of
communication and monitoring for successful governance
(Ostrom et al. 1992, Sally 1995, Janssen et al. 2010). Also, in the
social network structure of our experiment, connectors were
necessary for other roles to be effective contributors to group
success. This finding highlights the importance of relaying
information about others’ behaviors throughout the network, and
supports previous case study–based studies arguing that
connectors are key to explaining success in the governance of
social-ecological systems (e.g., Stubbs and Lemon 2001,
Tompkins et al. 2002). However, in an experimental setting, the
role of connector did not emerge when participants were
organized in a fully connected network (unpublished data). Thus,
the context of the action situation significantly influences which
social roles likely emerge and become crucial for improved
performance. When one of our successful combinations of roles
did not include a connector, it included the role of observer. The
observer role was necessary in half  of the better-performing role
combinations. This pattern highlights the importance of relaying
the information about others’ behaviors throughout the network
and is consistent with the empirical evidence that monitoring of
opportunistic behavior is crucial for robust governance of
common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010).  
The presence of an enforcer led to improved group performance
if  it was accompanied by either a connector (this role spreads the
enforcer’s threat throughout the social network) or an observer
and a moralist (the former monitors others’ actions and the latter
responds to the enforcer’s complaints). Our results also show that
most of the unsuccessful combinations had the role of enforcer,
a finding that does not conform to the suggested importance of
graduated sanctions (Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010) in the
literature. In our experiment, the option of enforcement was
available, but this role was usually activated when there was
already much unfair distribution of water among participants.
Thus, this pattern suggests that the emergence of an enforcer in
a group might be an indication of little or no collective action. A
similar pattern also occurred with the roles of observer and
moralist in some of the groups.  
The role of leader, considered as key for success (e.g., Gutiérrez
et al. 2011), was present in all groups, both successful and
unsuccessful. The performance of the group might be related to
the location of the role of leader in the social network. Players in
positions A and E rarely assumed the role of leader in the
successful combinations, in contrast to players in position C, who
assumed that role more frequently, whereas in the unsuccessful
combinations the leader was more uniformly distributed. In
addition, the role of leader was assigned based on the type of
messages (i.e., proposing a strategy/rule about investment or
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harvesting) rather than the type of strategy/rule being proposed.
It could be the case that a leader proposed a “wrong” strategy,
causing underinvestment or overharvesting. In addition, because
we coded players as leaders based on information found in the
chat messages that at least one player said he/she was going to
follow the proposed strategy/rule (i.e., without consideration of
the actual behavior of the players), it was possible that no player
actually followed the strategy/rule proposed by the coded leader.
Also, the role of leader was accompanied by the role of moralist
in half  of the successful combinations. Thus, success may depend
more on the type of leader that is present, e.g., a moralistic leader,
than on the strategies that the leader is advocating, and on others
recognizing that player as the leader rather than just the mere
presence of a leader. Another point to consider is the dynamics
of roles during the experiment. Kopelman et al. (2002) present
some examples of leaders emerging when cooperative experiences
fail. Future studies will determine if  the role of leader changes as
the outcomes of the strategies performed are evaluated.  
The network structure of the experiment also led to a situation
in which certain social roles occupied certain positions more
frequently. In general, players in positions B, C, and D were more
active in assuming roles compared with players in positions A and
E. The reason for this pattern is that positions B, C, and D are
more connected compared with positions A and E, and act as a
link between the most and least privileged positions in terms of
resource access. Downstream players, realizing the structural
inequality that they are locked into, are more likely to accept
unfair outcomes (Dayton-Johnson 2000). As a consequence,
individuals in position E who did not get enough water and
realized their structural disadvantage often did not complain (i.
e., did not assume the enforcer or observer roles) or try to change
the game strategy (i.e., assume the leader role). Because they have
privileged access to water, players in position A did not need to
assume many roles (e.g., enforcer) to obtain water.
CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to our understanding of how social roles
may influence governance of small-scale common-pool resource
systems. In addition, our results suggest that coding social roles
through the messages sent during the game can be useful in
understanding the role that communication plays in improving
outcomes of social dilemmas in behavioral experiments. An
important question for future research is the possible mismatch
between actions proposed through chat messages and actual
behavior during the game. This study complements previous case-
based studies on social roles using behavioral lab experiments.
Our study supports the importance of certain social roles, e.g.,
connector, as highlighted by existing research. However, we found
that it is not an individual role but certain combinations of social
roles that make up the necessary conditions for explaining
collective action in social-ecological systems. We also found that
the combinations of roles we identified are highly constrained by
the asymmetries in participants’ resource access capabilities. How
robust our findings are to different action situations (e.g., different
biophysical and social contexts) is an open question. We suggest
that this question poses an exciting and promising area of
explorative research to better understand conditions for
successful governance of common-pool resources.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
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Appendix 1. Experimental results. 
 
Group Total investment Total extractions Final earnings 
1 263 560 827 
2 251 455 732 
3 245 569 853 
4 259 581 842 
5 263 501 758 
6 242 547 822 
7 229 538 821 
8 274 459 696 
9 275 554 805 
10 266 582 839 
11 269 547 812 
12 198 306 623 
13 258 570 831 
14 291 540 773 
15 271 547 801 
16 320 563 762 
17 251 434 705 
18 133 137 532 
19 230 577 858 
20 246 542 812 
21 269 500 746 
22 244 516 786 
23 247 547 826 
TOTAL 
Mean 251.91 507.48 776.61 
Median 258 547 805 
SD 35.02 102.12 78.38 
Max 320 582 858 
Min 133 137 532 
Gini 0.27 0.35 0.23 
 
Appendix 2. Truth table of crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) at the group level 
using the percentage of the maximum earning as the indicator of group performance. Conditions 
are the social roles: L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, 
M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer. 
 
Conditions 
Outcome Number Consistency 
Cases 
L K C F M E O 
Group 
number 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1.000 1,7 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.000 3 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 0.800 10,13,14,20,22 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 0.750 5,6,11,23 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 0.500 4,8,12,15,19,21 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 0.333 2,9,18 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 16 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.000 17 
 
Appendix 3. Detailed QCA results. 
 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987) was used to analyze the combination of 
social roles necessary for groups of five participants in a computer-based irrigation experiment to 
succeed, i.e., reach a certain amount of water extraction. We considered seven types of social 
roles: leader, knowledge-generator, connector, follower, moralist, enforcer, and observer. Crisp-
set (csQCA) (Ragin 1987) and fuzzy-set (fsQCA) QCA (Ragin 2000) were used to analyze the 
presence and abundance of social roles in each group respectively. All analyses were conducted 
using the R Project (R Development Core Team, 2008) for Statistical Computing package, 
particularly applying the package QCA (Thiem and Dusa 2012).  
 
Whereas fsQCA was applied to the abundance of each role in the groups, csQCA was applied to 
two levels of analysis: group and individual level. The conditions at the group level were the 
presence of each role in the groups. At the individual level we undertook two types of analyses 
using: i) the presence of each role in the different players’ positions (positions A to E) and ii) 
each position independently. Table A3.1 shows the raw data used to perform the csQCA and 
fsQCA at the group level.  
 
Table A3.1. Crisp- and fuzzy-values of all conditions and the outcome group extraction (EXT). 
Conditions are the social roles: L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, 
M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer.  
Group 
Outcome Abundance of roles Fuzzy-values 
EXT 
cs-
value 
fs-
value 
L K C F M E O L K C F M E 0 
1 560 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 2 0.6 0.6 0 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 
2 455 0 0.4 2 2 3 2 0 1 2 1 0.8 1 0.8 0 0.6 0.8 
3 569 1 1 3 2 3 2 3 0 0 1 0.8 1 0.8 1 1 0 
4 581 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 
5 501 0 0.6 2 1 1 3 2 0 2 1 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 
6 547 1 0.8 1 3 2 2 3 0 3 0.6 1 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 
7 538 0 0.6 2 1 0 3 2 0 1 1 0.6 0 0.8 0.8 1 0.6 
8 459 0 0.4 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 
9 554 1 1 3 3 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 0.6 1 0 0.6 0.6 
10 582 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 1 0.6 0 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.6 
11 547 1 0.8 1 1 2 4 2 0 4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1 0.8 1 1 
12 306 0 0.2 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.6 
13 570 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 0.6 0.8 0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 
14 540 0 0.8 2 1 0 3 1 3 2 1 0.6 0 0.8 0.6 1 0.8 
15 547 1 0.8 2 2 2 4 3 2 4 1 0.8 0.8 1 1 0.2 1 
16 563 1 1 3 1 2 4 0 0 2 1 0.6 0.8 1 0 1 0.8 
17 434 0 0.4 1 1 1 2 3 2 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 1 0.2 0 
18 137 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 3 4 1 0.6 0.6 0.8 0 1 1 
19 577 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 1 
20 542 0 0.8 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 0.6 0.8 0 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.6 
21 500 0 0.6 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 1 
22 516 0 0.6 3 2 0 1 4 1 3 1 0.8 0 0.6 1 0.6 1 
23 547 1 0.8 1 1 2 3 1 0 3 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 1 1 
 
The core result of the QCA is the so-called truth-table. The truth-table list all possible 
combinations of the conditions and outcomes and shows how often they appear in the set of 
cases considered (i.e., consistency). The higher the value of consistency, the more cases or 
membership scores in the row agree in displaying the outcome. Tables A3.2, A3.4, A3.6 and 
A3.8 show the truth-table for the different QCA performed in this study: csQCA at the group 
level, fsQCA at the group level, csQCA for each position independently, and csQCA at the 
position level respectively. In addition to the sufficiency analysis that resulted in the truth-table, 
a necessity analysis was performed. Results of the sufficiency analysis are shown in Tables A3.3, 
A3.5, A3.7, and A3.9.  
 
 
Crisp-set QCA at the group level 
 
Table A3.2. Truth table of csQCA for the analysis of sufficiency for the group success. 
L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, 
O=Observer. 
Conditions Outcome 
Number Consistency 
Cases 
C M E O EXT Group number 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1.00 16 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1.00 3 
1 1 0 1 0 4 0.75 5,6,11,23 
1 1 1 1 0 6 0.50 4,8,12,15,19,21 
0 1 0 1 0 2 0.50 1,7 
0 1 1 1 0 5 0.40 10,13,14,20,22 
1 0 1 1 0 3 0.33 2,9,18 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0.33 17 
 
Table A3.3. Results of the csQCA for the analysis of necessity for the group success. L=Leader, 
K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer. 
 Consistency Coverage 
O 0.917 0.524 
M+e 0.917 0.550 
C+E 0.917 0.524 
C+M 1.000 0.522 
 
 
Fuzzy-set QCA at the group level 
 
Table A3.4. Truth table of fsQCA for the analysis of sufficiency for the group success. 
L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, 
O=Observer. 
Conditions Outcome 
Number Consistency 
Cases 
L K C F M E O EXT Group number 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 1.00 1,7,13,14,22 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.00 3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 0.96 4,5,6,8,11,19,21,23 
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0.94 10,20 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 0.87 12,15 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 0.83 2,9,16,18 
1 1 1 1 1 0 - 0 1 0.78 17 
 
Table A3.5. Results of the fsQCA for the analysis of necessity for the group success. L=Leader, 
K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer. 
 Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
F 0.928 0.811 c+E+O 0.952 0.767 
M+E 0.904 0.758 c+m+O 0.916 0.760 
K+O 0.904 0.765 c+m+E 0.916 0.784 
K+E 0.940 0.772 c+M+O 0.940 0.743 
K+c 0.916 0.800 C+e+O 0.904 0.758 
L+O 0.940 0.743 C+E+O 0.904 0.743 
L+E 0.940 0.743 C+m+O 0.916 0.776 
L+M 0.928 0.733 k+E+O 0.904 0.765 
L+c 0.940 0.757 K+C+e 0.904 0.815 
L+C 0.916 0.752 K+C+m 0.904 0.806 
L+K 0.916 0.745 K+C+M 0.916 0.776 
m+E+O 0.916 0.760 l+E+O 0.904 0.765 
M+e+O 0.904 0.750    
 
 
Crisp-set QCA for each position independently 
 
Table A3.6. Truth table of csQCA for the analysis of sufficiency for the group success at each 
position. L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, 
E=Enforcer, O=Observer. 
Position A 
Conditions Outcome 
Number Consistency 
Cases 
L K C F M E O EXT Group number 
0 0  1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000 15 
0 0  1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 6 
0 1  0 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 1 
0 1  1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 11 
1 0  1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000 16 
0 0  0 0 0 0 0 4 0.750 4,13,22,23 
1 1  0 1 0 0 0 3 0.667  3,17,19  
1 1  0 0 0 0 0 2 0.500 10,12  
0 0  1 0 0 0 0 4 0.250 5,7,9,20  
0 0  1 1 0 0 0 1 0.000  14 
0 1  0 1 0 0 0 1 0.000  8 
0 1  1 0 1 1 0 1 0.000  18 
1 1  0 0 1 1 0 1 0.000  2 
1 1  0 1 0 1 0 1 0.000  21 
 
Position B 
Conditions Outcome Number Consistency Cases 
L K C F M E O EXT Group number 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.000 3 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 4 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 9 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 15 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 0.750 2,11,19,23 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0.667 10,13,17 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0.500 6,22  
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.500 5,16 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.000 8,21 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 12 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 18 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.000 14 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.000 7 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 20 
 
Position C 
Conditions Outcome 
Number Consistency 
Cases 
L K C F M E O EXT Group number 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1.000 1,4 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 10 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000 11 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000 6 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 16 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 9 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 0.600 5,7,13,19,23 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.500 15,22 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0.333 2,3,8 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.000 17,18 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.000 20 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 14 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.000 21 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.000 12 
 
Position D 
Conditions Outcome 
Number Consistency 
Cases 
L K C F M E O EXT Group number 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1.000 13,16 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.000 15 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 6 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 10 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1.000 11 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1.000 3 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000 9 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 0.667 19,21,23 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.500 1,7 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.500 4,12 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.000 20 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.000 5 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.000 15 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.000 17 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.000 2 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.000 14 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.000 22 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.000 8 
 
Position E 
Conditions Outcome 
Number Consistency 
Cases 
L K C F M E O EXT Group number 
0 0  1 0 0 0 1 3 1.000 1,11,23  
0 1  0 1 0 0 1 1 1.000 6 
1 1  0 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 3 
0 0  0 0 1 0 0 4 0.750 4,10,13,17 
0 1  0 0 1 0 0 3 0.667  15,19,20 
0 0  0 0 0 0 0 3 0.333  5,7,16 
0 0  1 0 1 0 0 3 0.333 9,12,14  
0 0  1 0 1 1 0 1 0.000  8 
0 1  0 0 0 0 0 1 0.000  2 
0 1  0 1 1 1 0 1 0.000  22 
1 0  0 0 1 0 0 1 0.000  21 
1 0  0 0 1 1 0 1 0.000  18 
 
Table A3.7. Results of the csQCA for the analysis of necessity for the group success. L=Leader, 
K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer. 
Position A 
 Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
A.e 1.000 0.571 A.l+A.k+A.M 0.917 0.550 
A.f+A.O 0.917 0.611 A.l+A.K+A.O 1.000 0.522 
A.F+A.o 1.000 0.571 A.l+A.K+A.F 1.000 0.522 
A.k+A.o 0.917 0.579 A.L+A.m+A.O 1.000 0.571 
A.k+A.f 0.917 0.524 A.L+A.M+A.o 0.917 0.524 
A.K+A.m 0.917 0.524 A.L+A.F+A.m 1.000 0.545 
A.l+A.o 0.917 0.550 A.L+A.k+A.O 0.917 0.524 
A.l+A.M+A.O 0.917 0.524 A.L+A.k+A.m 0.917 0.524 
A.l+A.f+A.m 1.000 0.522 A.L+A.k+A.M 0.917 0.524 
A.l+A.F+A.M 0.917 0.550 A.L+A.k+A.F 0.917 0.524 
 
Position B 
 Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
B.e 1.000 0.545 B.l+B.C+B.o 0.917 0.611 
B.F 0.917 0.611 B.l+B.C+B.O 0.917 0.524 
B.F*B.e 0.917 0.611 B.l+B.C+B.m 0.917 0.550 
B.k+B.o 0.917 0.550 B.l+B.C+B.M 0.917 0.579 
B.L+B.k 0.917 0.524 B.l+B.C+B.f 0.917 0.524 
B.c+B.M+B.O 0.917 0.524 B.l+B.k+B.M 0.917 0.524 
B.C+B.M+B.o 1.000 0.632 B.l+B.k+B.C 0.917 0.524 
B.C+B.f+B.o 0.917 0.524 B.l+B.K+B.o 0.917 0.579 
B.k+B.m+B.O 1.000 0.522 B.l+B.K+B.O 0.917 0.550 
B.k+B.c+B.O 1.000 0.522 B.l+B.K+B.m 0.917 0.550 
B.k+B.c+B.M 1.000 0.522 B.l+B.K+B.M 0.917 0.579 
B.k+B.C+B.m 1.000 0.522 B.l+B.K+B.f 0.917 0.550 
B.K+B.M+B.O 0.917 0.579 B.l+B.K+B.c 0.917 0.524 
B.K+B.C+B.M 1.000 0.632 B.l+B.K+B.C 0.917 0.611 
B.l+B.m+B.O 1.000 0.545 B.L+B.M+B.O 0.917 0.550 
B.l+B.M+B.o 1.000 0.600 B.L+B.C+B.o 0.917 0.524 
B.l+B.f+B.m 0.917 0.524 B.L+B.C+B.M 0.917 0.579 
B.l+B.c+B.O 0.917 0.524 B.K+B.c+B.m+B.o 1.000 0.522 
B.l+B.c+B.M 0.917 0.524 B.L+B.c+B.m+B.o 1.000 0.522 
 
Position C 
 Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
C.e 1.000 0.545 C.L+C.C.  0.917  0.611 
C.m+C.O 1.000  0.545 C.k+C.f+C.m 1.000 0.522 
C.F+C.O 1.000  0.600 C.k+C.C+C.f 1.000 0.522 
C.F+C.M 1.000  0.600 C.K+C.M+C.o 0.917 0.550 
C.c.+C.m  1.000  0.522 C.k+C.c+C.o 0.917 0.524 
C.c.+C.F  1.000  0.545 C.l+C.M+C.o 1.000  0.522 
C.C.+C.O  1.000  0.632 C.l+C.f+C.o 0.917  0.524 
C.C.+C.M  1.000  0.632 C.l+C.f+C.m  0.917  0.524 
C.k+C.O 0.917 0.524 C.l+C.c.+C.o  1.000  0.522 
C.L+C.O  0.917  0.647 C.l+C.C.+C.f  0.917  0.524 
C.L+C.F  1.000  0.600 C.L+C.k+C.m 1.000 0.522 
 
Position D 
 Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
D.e+D.o  0.917  0.524 D.c+D.F+D.o  1.000  0.522 
D.e+D.O  0.917  0.579 D.c+D.F+D.m  0.917  0.524 
D.m+D.O  0.917  0.611 D.c+D.F+D.M  0.917  0.524 
D.m+D.e  0.917  0.550 D.C+D.E+D.O  0.917  0.550 
D.M+D.e  0.917  0.550 D.C+D.f+D.O  0.917  0.524 
D.f+D.e  0.917  0.550 D.C+D.F+D.O  0.917  0.579 
D.f+D.m  0.917  0.550 D.C+D.F+D.E 0.917  0.524 
D.F+D.e  0.917  0.550 D.C+D.F+D.M  0.917  0.524 
D.c+D.e  0.917  0.550 D.K+D.F+D.M 0.917 0.524 
D.C+D.e  0.917  0.550 D.K+D.c+D.F 0.917 0.524 
D.C+D.m  0.917  0.579 D.K+D.C+D.o 0.917 0.524 
D.k+D.O 0.917 0.579 D.K+D.C+D.f 0.917 0.550 
D.k+D.e 1.000 0.545 D.l+D.E+D.O  0.917  0.579 
D.k+D.m 1.000 0.571 D.l+D.M+D.O  0.917  0.550 
D.k+D.F 0.917 0.579 D.l+D.M+D.E  0.917  0.524 
D.k+D.c 0.917 0.524 D.l+D.f+D.O  1.000  0.522 
D.l+D.e 0.917  0.524 D.l+D.F+D.M  0.917  0.550 
D.l+D.c  0.917  0.550 D.l+D.C+D.O  0.917  0.550 
D.l+D.k 0.917 0.579 D.l+D.K+D.M 0.917 0.524 
D.L+D.e  0.917  0.579 D.l+D.K+D.f 1.000 0.522 
D.L+D.m  0.917  0.579 D.L+D.C+D.O  0.917  0.550 
D.L+D.F  0.917  0.524 D.L+D.K+D.C 0.917 0.579 
D.m+D.E+D.o  0.917  0.524 D.K+D.F+D.E+D.O 0.917 0.524 
D.F+D.M+D.o  1.000  0.522 D.K+D.c+D.M+D.O 0.917 0.550 
D.F+D.M+D.E  0.917  0.524 D.K+D.C+D.M+D.E 0.917 0.524 
D.c+D.m+D.E  0.917  0.524 D.L+D.K+D.c+D.O 0.917 0.550 
D.c+D.f+D.O  0.917  0.550    
 
Position E 
 Consistency Coverage  Consistency Coverage 
E.o 1.000  0.600 E.k+E.f 1.000 0.522 
E.m 0.917  0.524 E.k+E.M+E.E 0.917 0.524 
E.l 0.917  0.550 E.K+E.F+E.E 0.917 0.550 
E.m*E.o  0.917  0.579 E.L+E.K+E.E 0.917 0.524 
E.l*E.o  0.917  0.611 E.L+E.F+E.M+E.E 0.917 0.579 
E.f+E.e  0.917 0.579    
 
 
Crisp-set QCA at the position level 
 
Table A3.8. Truth table of csQCA for the analysis of sufficiency for the group success. 
Out=Outcome, n=Number of cases, Const=Consistency, L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, 
C=Connector, F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer. 
Position 
Out 
n Cons. 
Cases 
A B C D E 
Condition EXT 
Group 
number 
L M E O L M E O L M E O L M E O L M E O 
    
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 23 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 13 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 9 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 15 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 11 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 6 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 10 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 16 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 19 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 20 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 22 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 18 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 8 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 14 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 12 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 17 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 21 
 
Table A3.9. Results of the csQCA for the analysis of necessity for the group success. To simplfy 
the table, the role of observer and the role of enforcer in positions A, B, and C were not included. 
Cons.=Consistency, Cov.=Coverage, L=Leader, K=Knowledge generator, C=Connector, 
F=Follower, M=Moralist, E=Enforcer, O=Observer, A.=Player in position A, B.=Player in 
position B, C.=Player in position C, D.=Player in position D, E.=Player in position E. 
 
Cons. Cov. 
 
Cons. Cov. 
 
Cons. Cov. 
E.m 0.917 0.524 B.l+C.L 0.917 0.579 A.l+C.L+D.M 0.917 0.55 
E.l 0.917 0.55 B.L+D.E 0.917 0.524 A.l+B.l+E.E 1 0.522 
C.E 1 0.545 A.l+D.E 0.917 0.524 A.l+B.L+E.E 0.917 0.524 
B.E 1 0.545 A.l+D.m 0.917 0.524 A.l+B.L+D.L 0.917 0.579 
A.E 1 0.571 A.L+D.E 0.917 0.579 A.l+B.L+C.l 0.917 0.524 
C.E*E.m 0.917 0.55 D.m+E.L+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+D.m+E.E 0.917 0.524 
C.E*E.l 0.917 0.579 D.m+D.E+E.L 0.917 0.579 A.L+D.m+D.E 0.917 0.579 
B.E*E.m 0.917 0.55 D.l+E.L+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+D.l+E.E 0.917 0.579 
B.E*E.l 0.917 0.579 D.l+D.E+E.E 0.917 0.55 A.L+D.l+D.m 0.917 0.55 
B.E*C.E 1 0.571 D.l+D.m+E.L 0.917 0.55 A.L+D.l+D.M 0.917 0.524 
A.E*E.m 0.917 0.579 D.l+D.M+E.E 1 0.545 A.L+C.L+E.M 0.917 0.611 
A.E*E.l 0.917 0.579 D.l+D.M+D.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+C.L+D.m 0.917 0.55 
A.E*C.E 1 0.6 C.L+D.m+E.L 0.917 0.579 A.L+C.L+D.M 0.917 0.55 
A.E*B.E 1 0.6 C.L+D.M+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+C.L+D.l 0.917 0.55 
B.E*C.E*E.m 0.917 0.579 C.L+D.M+E.M 0.917 0.611 A.L+B.l+E.E 0.917 0.55 
B.E*C.E*E.l 0.917 0.611 C.L+D.M+D.E 0.917 0.55 A.L+B.L+D.m 0.917 0.524 
A.E*C.E*E.m 0.917 0.611 C.L+D.l+D.M 0.917 0.55 A.L+B.L+D.l 0.917 0.524 
A.E*C.E*E.l 0.917 0.611 B.l+EM+E.E 0.917 0.55 A.L+B.L+C.L 0.917 0.524 
A.E*B.E*E.m 0.917 0.611 B.l+D.E+E.E 0.917 0.524 C.L+E.L+E.M+E.E 0.917 0.524 
A.E*B.E*E.l 0.917 0.611 B.l+D.M+E.E 0.917 0.55 C.L+D.E+E.L+E.M 0.917 0.55 
A.E*B.E*C.E 1 0.632 B.l+D.L+E.E 0.917 0.55 C.L+D.l+D.E+E.L 0.917 0.55 
A.E*B.E*C.E*E.m 0.917 0.647 B.l+C.l+E.E 0.917 0.55 B.l+D.L+D.E+E.M 0.917 0.55 
A.E*B.E*C.E*E.l 0.917 0.647 B.L+D.m+E.L 0.917 0.55 B.l+D.L+D.M+E.M 0.917 0.55 
D.E+E.E 1 0.522 B.L+D.l+E.E 0.917 0.524 B.l+C.l+D.L+D.E 0.917 0.55 
D.m+E.E 0.917 0.611 B.L+D.l+D.M 0.917 0.524 B.l+C.l+D.L+D.M 0.917 0.524 
D.m+D.E 0.917 0.55 B.L+C.L+D.M 0.917 0.55 B.L+D.l+D.E+E.L 0.917 0.55 
D.M+D.E 0.917 0.55 A.l+EL+E.E 0.917 0.524 B.L+C.L+E.L+E.E 0.917 0.524 
D.l+D.E 0.917 0.524 A.l+D.E+E.E 0.917 0.55 B.L+C.L+D.E+E.L 0.917 0.55 
D.L+D.E 0.917 0.579 A.l+D.M+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.l+B.L+D.E+E.L 0.917 0.55 
D.L+D.m 0.917 0.579 A.l+D.l+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.l+B.L+D.M+D.E 0.917 0.579 
C.l+D.m 0.917 0.55 A.l+D.l+E.L 0.917 0.524 A.L+B.l+D.E+E.M 0.917 0.55 
C.l+D.l 0.917 0.524 A.l+D.l+D.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+B.l+D.M+E.M 0.917 0.579 
C.L+E.E 0.917 0.688 A.l+D.l+D.M 0.917 0.524 A.L+B.l+D.L+E.M 0.917 0.611 
C.L+D.E 0.917 0.611 A.l+D.L+E.E 0.917 0.579 A.L+B.l+D.L+D.E 0.917 0.55 
C.L+D.L 0.917 0.611 A.l+C.l+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+B.l+D.L+D.M 0.917 0.55 
B.l+D.E 0.917 0.579 A.l+C.L+E.E 0.917 0.524 A.L+B.l+C.l+D.E 0.917 0.579 
B.l+D.m 0.917 0.579 A.l+C.L+E.L 0.917 0.55 A.L+B.l+C.l+D.M 0.917 0.524 
B.l+D.l 0.917 0.55 A.l+C.L+D.E 0.917 0.55 A.L+B.l+C.l+D.L 0.917 0.55 
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